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Abstract 
This paper addresses the noteworthy relevance of U.S. Politics in explaining the impact of 
corporate misconducts on stock returns. Using a database of regulatory violations in the U.S., 
the Event Study framework was employed to quantify, for each misbehavior, the resultant effect 
on the felonious firm’s stock. Those effects were then regressed on focal dummy variables, 
mirroring the acting political landscape. Ultimately, it is proven misconducts happening under 
one party control of both Executive and Legislative branches tended to result in higher stock 
returns than if there is division of any sort. This research is among the first attempts to directly 
relate regulatory violations and Politics. 
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This work project aims to further complement the research field that analyses the connection 
between Finance and Politics. It provides empirical evidence suggesting the stock market reacts 
differently to U.S. firms’ misconducts based on Political Cycles, which for this purpose are 
defined by the party controlling the Presidency and/or the bicameral U.S. Congress. A company 
being sued or finned in the course of performing its operational activities is rather common in 
the corporate environment, making it highly relevant for investors to understand all the factors 
that depict possible subsequent stock price variations. 
Ever since the U.S. Government passed the first antitrust law in 1890 (FTC 2013), starting 
its increasingly active role in monitoring business, intellectuals hold two opposing views in 
approaching firm regulation. One side claims firm compliance with those laws diminishes 
gainful business opportunities and innovation that would benefit the whole society, while the 
other defends the importance of those rules in limiting financial fraud and harmful activities of 
companies towards consumers, workers, other competitors and even the environment. These 
differing approaches are also evident amongst the two major U.S. political parties. The 
Democratic Party platform promotes a great Government evolvement in business by 
eliminating tax loopholes, demanding a higher transparency in company accounting (Peters & 
Wooley 2004) and limiting concentration of economic power, which ensures fairness for all 
stakeholders evolved in the competitive markets (Cuomo 2003, 66). Alternatively, the 
Republican Party (GOP) endorses a more relaxed Government intervention in firm’s activities 
through a regular assessment and discontinuation of regulative measures deemed outdated and 
costly to the economy, as well as the implementation of lower corporate tax rates, considered 
key not to impair job creation (Peters & Wooley 2012). 
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The mentioned differences in ideology clearly set the adoption of different policies 
depending on the party controlling the branches of Government. It may be predictable that there 
shall be more documented company misconducts under Democratic leaderships than in 
Republican ones. However, it is not straightforward to infer if the party controlling Government 
influences how the stock market will respond to a recorded violation, with or without monetary 
penalty. This project contributes to understand this inquiry by using an Event Study approach 
to access whether stock price deviations of lawbreaking companies are significant and then if 
those deviations can be explained by the composition of the presiding Government. 
This paper is organized as follows: in the next part (Section 2) it is presented a brief 
oversight of the theoretical foundations behind the Event Study framework, as well as past 
research done on both the impact of corporate misconducts and the studied connection between 
Politics and Finance. Those readings inspired the draft of two hypotheses (A and B) to be tested. 
Then, in Sections 3 and 4, it is prudently described the methodology adopted to address the 
mentioned research proposal and the sources of data used, respectively. Afterwards, the results 
obtained are presented and discussed in Section 5, along with its significance and robustness 
assessment. Finally, the work project concludes with Section 6, in which the relevant findings 
are summarized, the limitations of the research are described and suggestions for future studies 
are proposed. 
2. Hypothesis and Related Literature  
(Fama 1970) drafted the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), one cornerstone of financial 
theory, defending that asset prices fully reflect all available information. According to the semi-
strong form of efficiency, this includes all news and situations publicly disclosed. That data is 
rapidly incorporated, prompting investors’ reactions that result in price deviations, and yielding 
returns for asset holders. This constitutes the theoretical basis behind Event Studies (MacKinlay 
4 
 
1997), which portray a certain occurrence, ranging from a firm’s dividend announcement to a 
natural catastrophe, and access its impact on stock prices. It employs the concept of Abnormal 
Returns (ARs), detailed as the price variations exclusively attributed to the consequences of the 
event. The significance of ARs can be accessed not only on the day of the event, but also a 
certain number of days before and/or after its occurrence. The decided timespan to be analyzed 
is called the event window and the sum of the ARs during this period is the Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR). (Chen & Siems 2004) point out when investors react positively to a 
certain event, the ARs of the event window should be positive, while if the opposite occurs, 
those would be negative.  In the next section, it will be discussed how to properly estimate ARs. 
There is an extensive literature that uses Event Studies as the methodology to derive 
interesting conclusions. For example, (Škrinjarić & Orlović 2019) studied the influence of four 
political and two economic events, related with the downfall of the large multi-industry 
company Agrokor, on the Zagreb Stock Exchange. They evaluated two samples of stocks: 
Agrokor related ones and other companies frequently traded on the market. In most of the 
events, by analyzing the CAR of the different stocks and computing average values for each of 
the two samples, the authors estimated negative and significant values for the first group, while 
positive and non-significant values for the second one. This allowed them to conclude those 
events created an undesirable performance for stocks related with Agrokor, though not 
significantly affecting other companies distinct from the corporate giant. 
Furthermore, regarding business wrongdoings, there is also a broad research analyzing its 
implications to the offending firms. (Carberry, Engelen & Essen 2018) studied the effect of 
misconducts on the stock market. Their research characterized the types of costs incurred by 
felonious companies: direct legal fees, correctional costs to avoid future recurrences and 
reputational penalties, being the latter the one that usually causes enhanced damage. The 
database used by the authors constituted of 345 misconducts reported in the press of 5 European 
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Countries. Through an event study, the CARs credited to the misconducts were computed over 
a 5-day event window. Then, the authors regressed the obtained CARs with respect to several 
variables, including the profoundness of the evidence disclosed by the media and if the 
misconduct was reported on the same country of the firm’s Headquarters (HQ). The results 
pointed that the higher the reliability and clarity of the information published regarding the 
transgression, the more negative were the respective CAR verified. This enhanced reaction also 
occurs if the wrongdoing is reported on the country of the HQ. The conclusions of (Carberry, 
Engelen & Essen 2018) preambles the first Hypothesis to be tested in this Work Project: 
Proposition A: “Overall, the Cumulative Abnormal Returns caused by the recorded 
corporate misconducts of U.S firms are negative in value and significant” 
On the other hand, considering now the relationship between Politics and Finance, although 
being branded by (Zingales 2017) as a field “under-researched” for several years, current 
literature already supports a strong connection between the two spheres. (Kempf & Tsoutsoura 
2018) proved that credit rating analysts with a party affiliation not aligned with the one of the 
U.S. President tended to downward-adjust their ratings more frequently. In average, for the 
same firm and in the same quarter, it quantifies as a lower 0.0134 notches, roughly, which over 
a four-year presidential mandate implies a 0.21 notches difference. The authors classified party 
affiliation based on past voter registration records. Conversely, no significant deviations in 
credit ratings were verified by using as benchmark the parties controlling the chambers of 
Congress (Senate and House of Representatives), instead of the one holding the Presidency.   
In addition, (Pastor & Veronesi 2017), examined, from the time between 1927 to 2015, that 
under Democratic Presidencies the average excess stock market return was 10.69%, while under 
Republican ones that figure was much lower at -0.21%. That gap was proved to be statistically 
relevant and in line with the previous literature (Santa-Clara & Valkanov 2003). Since the 
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greater returns could not be explained by higher risks incurred, (Pastor & Veronesi 2017) 
proposed an explanation based on the role of risk aversion in determining voter behavior. They 
suggest when risk aversion among voters rises (for instance, in recessionary periods), 
Democratic Presidents tend to be elected with higher probability. This is due to the increased 
desire for “social insurance”. The unwillingness to take increased risks is translated into 
demands for higher risk premiums, justifying the found gap. Lastly, the authors could not find 
any significant gap in returns by focusing on the party controlling the U.S Congress. 
Moreover, another paper by (Brans & Scholtens 2020) uses an event study to investigate 
the impact of U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s tweets on the stock market. The sample used 
was composed by 100 tweets, graded in terms of sentiment transmitted, that contained a name 
of a publicly listed company. It was found tweets with strong negative sentiment regarding a 
certain firm trigger a significant decrease in its stock price. Finally, (Freixa 2009) went beyond 
the stock market by discovering that under Republican Presidencies, long-term treasury bonds 
historically provided higher significant absolute and excess returns. Those discrepancies were 
shown not to be explained by higher risk taken nor economic cycles. 
In sum, this literature provides persuasive reasoning to test a second premise in this project: 
Proposition B: “The Political Cycles are notable factors in accessing stock market 
reaction to U.S firm’s recorded misconducts” 
By verifying the veracity of the two stated hypotheses, this paper contributes to the research 
field analyzing the relationship between Politics and Finance. It is among the first attempts to 
directly infer about the importance of the Government arrangement in breaking down stock 
price response of companies that violated regulations and were punished for it. As described, it 





As stated, this paper aims to prove there is evidence supporting Political Cycles are pertinent 
in evaluating stock market reaction to a corporate misconduct. To do this it was deem fit to 
perform a two-part analysis. In the first part, by using a broad database of registered 
misconducts in the U.S., an event study will be carried to estimate, for each wrongdoing, the 
resulting Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) on the felonious firm’s stock. Then, in the 
second part, OLS regressions will be constructed using the obtained CARs as dependent 
variables. The focal regressors will be variables that characterize the U.S. political landscape. 
3.1. Event Study – Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) and its significance 
To launch this approach, it is critical to understand how Abnormal Returns (ARs) associated 
to an event are calculated. 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏 =  𝑅𝑖,𝜏 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝜏|𝑋𝜏) 




Equation (1) indicates how to estimate the AR for stock i at time τ, with τ belonging to the 
selected event window. Since the event study focuses on an event that already happened, the 
actual return yielded at τ, Ri,τ, is known. E(Ri,τ│Xτ) is the normal return, which is the one 
predicted to take place had the event not occurred. It is estimated using an asset pricing model 
that employs, as input, past returns over an ancient timespan, commonly called the estimation 
window. Those returns are an example of the level of information considered, Xτ. To sum up, 
AR is in fact the ex-post observed residuals for the asset pricing model used. The existence of 
those residuals is credited to the impact caused by the event. Recall by summing all the ARs 





Furthermore, besides providing the lawbreaking firm’s name and monetary punishment, the 
used database includes a registration date characterizing the misconduct.  This study uses that 
date or the following trading day (in case the registered date was not a trading day) as the event 
day. As well as evaluating the behavior of the stocks’ returns on the day of the event, it was 
also considered crucial to access ARs in each of the three days after the registration, to capture 
possible delayed reactions or continuous deviations in stock prices. In addition, the same was 
done on the three days before, which allows to mitigate the risk of the market reflecting 
misconduct effects before the day of its registration. This means the event window for this study 
consists of 7 days. Several authors propose wider event windows like 11 (e.g., (He, Sun, Zhang 
& Li 2020)) or 21 (e.g., (Škrinjarić & Orlović 2019)) days but, for this project, it should be 
recognized most business misconducts do not cause extended repercussions on equity value, 
given its resulting low costs or inexistent news coverage. The adopted tighter event window 
follows the reasoning of (Carberry, Engelen & Essen 2018) because of the similarities between 
the two studies. (Kothari & Warner 2007) praised the adoption of smaller event windows, which 
are more immune to biases from other confounding events taking place very closely to the one 




Additionally, the model implemented to estimate normal returns was the Famma French 
three Factor Model (Fama & French 1993), a logic in accordance with past literature (eg., 
(Lundgren & Olsson 2010) and (Cassella & Rizzo 2020)). It was decided to consider an 
estimation window of 250 trading days to calculate the expected returns. (Brown & Warner 
1985) defended the contemplation of at least 120 trading days to accurately estimate normal 
Estimation Window Trading Day Gap 
τ0 = 0 
(Event Day) 
τ1 = -3 τ2 = 3 τ3 = -263 τ4 = -13 
Event Window 
Fig.1 – Inputs for the Event Study. The referential for this scale is the event date, τ0. 
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returns. Still, it seemed reasonable to use 250 days to avoid possible seasonal biases. The usage 
of a full trading year for the estimation window was also employed by (Brans & Scholtens 
2020) and (Škrinjarić & Orlović 2019) in their event studies. The final aspect to be considered 
in this assessment was the inclusion of a trading day gap between the two windows. (Law, 
Cornelsen, Adams, Penney, Rutter, White & Smith 2020) highlighted the estimation window 
should be mutually exclusive from the event window as to avoid any impact of the event 
examined in the estimation of normal returns. Employing a gap ensures the precision of the 
computed ARs. This paper considers a gap of 10 trading days. Figure 1 accurately provides the 
complete timeline analysis considered in this event study.  
Compiling all inputs, for each stock of the offending firms’ group, the daily ARs within the 
event window and the resulting CARs were estimated. Given the large number of misconducts 
examined, that computation was only possible given the reliance on the U.S Daily Event Study 
software of Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). In order to understand the general 
behavior of ARs, for each day of the event window, it will be addressed the ARs sample 
arithmetic average, which is defined as the Average Abnormal Return (AAR) figure. 
Similarly, to quantify the overall impact produced by the misconducts on the stocks of 
offending firms, the arithmetic average of the CARs in sample was calculated, designated as 
the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR). Then, with the aim of accessing whether 
that impact could be labelled as empirically significant the CAAR was subject to a t-test 
(Equation (3)), where σCAR(τ1,τ2) is the estimated standard deviation of the CARs across the 
sample. The result of this procedure will permit to deduce whether the CAAR attributed to 
misconducts is negative and significantly different from zero. If that is the case, then there is 
strong evidence supporting Proposition A. 
𝑇 − 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =  
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝜏1, 𝜏2)
𝜎𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝜏1,𝜏2)
 ~ 𝑁(0,1) (3) 
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Finally, to ensure the derived conclusion is robust, the result of the Patell Z test (Patell 1976) 
is also presented, which was automatically calculated by the WRDS software. It is key to 
remark the two mentioned tests assume the ARs are normally distributed. The literature 
classifies such tests as Parametric Tests and supports those should be complemented with 
examinations that do not carry such assumption. The latter ones are branded as Nonparametric 
Tests and this paper analyses the result of one: the Generalized Sign Test Statistic (Cowan 
1992), also estimated by the U.S. Daily Event Study Software. 
3.2. Regression Analysis – The role of Politics 
After quantifying the consequences misconducts produced on stock prices of offending 
firms, this second part focuses now on sources that could explain differences in the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs) computed across the various registered violations. Special attention 
will be given to Politics to access the accuracy of Proposition B. Still, before including political 
explanatory variables, the first OLS regression to be estimated will aim to prove a linear 
relationship between the monetary penalty of a misconduct and the verified CAR: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏0 +  𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝜏0 +  𝜖𝑖,𝜏0  
In Equation 4, the variable Penaltyi,τ0 is the registered fee for a certain misconduct, event 
studied with date τ0, perpetrated by firm i. The recorded fee will be in millions of dollars (M$). 
Likewise, CAR is the cumulative abnormal return for firm i’s stock over the event window 
within τ1 and τ2. Through a t-test, the significance of Penaltyi,τ0 will be evaluated. In addition, 
Zi,t0 is a vector of firm-level control variables, known to affect stock returns. In their paper, 
(Cassella & Rizzo 2020) proposed certain controls that were the basis for this vector: Book to 
Market Ratio, Profitability Ratio, Size, Lagged 1-Month Stock Return, Previous 12-Month 
Stock Return and Volatility. All metrics were measured one month before the event date τ0, as 




how the controls were computed. In accordance, γ is the respective coefficient vector for the 
control variables. The inclusion of this vector will increase significantly the fit of the 
regressions, improving the accuracy of the significance analysis for other regressors of interest. 
Consequently, for the remainder of this project, Zi,t0 and Penaltyi,τ0 will be incorporated in all 
regressions. 
Moreover, the closure of this paper concentrates on the insertion of political variables in the 
preliminary regression (4), and its subsequent significance study. It is vital to note the variables 
replicate U.S. Political Cycles with a 6-month lag. This adopted assumption is based on the 
impression that a new Government does not instantaneously implement policies and ideas, 
which will distinct the new from the previous Political Cycle. (Pastor & Veronesi 2017) used 
various period lags in their paper to characterize political transitions, being a 6-month one 
among those considered. The proposed regressions are divided in three spheres of focus, 
Presidency, U.S. Congress and Political Power Efficiency: 
a) Presidency 
Presidential administrations serve in four-year terms and constitute the Executive Branch 
of the U.S. Government. As described, past literature proves that it exists a noteworthy 
relationship between the political party controlling the Presidency and stock market returns. 
The linear OLS Regression presented in (5) is an attempt to infer on the significance of the 
President’s political alignment in the reaction of stock prices to a corporate misconduct:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏0 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝜏0 +  𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝜏0 + 𝜖𝑖,𝜏0   
The dummy variable DemocraticPresidentτ0 takes the value of 1 if the President associated 





b) U.S. Congress 
On the other hand, the Legislative branch of the U.S. Government is divided into two 
chambers: The Senate and the House of Representatives. The 100 elected Senators serve 6-year 
staggered mandates, with one third of the chamber facing elections every 2 years. On the 
contrary, the 435 Representatives serving in the House have 2-year terms. Since legislators of 
both chambers are inaugurated on the same day, this means every two years, a new Congress is 
installed, with a different party composition from the previous one. Most initiatives proposed 
by the President, as well as new laws and policies need Congress approval, highlighting the 
importance of this body in Government. However, as previously noted, various authors 
concluded the configuration of Congress does not significantly relate with their proposed 
financial metrics, being regressions (6) and (7) an effort to expand on those findings: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏0 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑀𝑎𝑗𝜏0 +  𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝜏0 +  𝜖𝑖,𝜏0 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏0 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑀𝑎𝑗𝜏0 +  𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝜏0 + 𝜖𝑖,𝜏0   
The dummy variables SenateDemocraticMajτ0 and HouseDemocraticMajτ0 will equal to 1 if 
the Democratic Party has a member majority and, consequently, the control of the Senate and 
House of Representatives, respectively. If the mentioned scenarios are not a reality for the 
associated misconduct with event date τ0., then the variables will correspondingly be 0.  
c) Political Power Efficiency 
Lastly, after analyzing both the Executive and Legislative branches of Government 
separately, it is also worth accessing the connection between the two. The U.S. Constitution 
sets a system of various checks and balances, imposing a clear division of powers between the 
governing bodies, which ensures that none would be labeled as over influential. Still, when the 





implement an ideological agenda, with new policies. Instead, if different parties control these 
branches, various disagreements may compromise the creation of new legislation. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏0 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝜏0 +  𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝜏0 +  𝜖𝑖,𝜏0 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏0 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠&𝑆𝑒𝑛𝜏0 +  𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝜏0 +  𝜖𝑖,𝜏0 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏0 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠&𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝜏0 +  𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝜏0 +  𝜖𝑖,𝜏0 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏0 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝐺𝑜𝑣𝜏0 +  𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝜏0 +  𝜖𝑖,𝜏0 
      Regressions (8) to (11) will test dummy variables that reflect the balance of power in 
Government. If Congress is entirely controlled by one party, SamePartyCongressτ0 will be 1. 
Additionally, SamePartyPres&Senτ0 equals 1 if the party monitoring the Presidency and with a 
Senate majority is the same. Moreover, variable SamePartyPres&Houseτ0 takes the value of 1 
when the President represents the same party with most members in the House of 
Representatives. Finally, if one party has control of the Executive branch and both chambers of 
Congress, SamePartyGovτ0 will amount to 1. All mentioned variables are null if not equal to 1. 
      In the end, it is also worth addressing the reason behind the separation of the mentioned 
political dummy variables in different regressions. This was done to avoid problems related 
with multicollinearity, which may diminish the precision of the coefficients’ significance 
assessment. Possible multicollinearity is greatly evident in the last sphere, since it is reasonable 
to predict SamePartyGovτ0 is fairly correlated with the other three political dummy variables.  
4. Data 
The cornerstone of the event study portrayed in this work project was the Violation 
Tracker’s Database constructed by the Good Jobs First National Policy Resource Center. It 
compiles a collection of cases prosecuted by Federal and Local Regulatory Agencies, the U.S. 







gathered a set of complimentary information like the accused company’s name, stock ticker 
(only applicable to some records), the monetary punishment to be paid, the type of misconduct 
incurred and the date when the case was registered. Additionally, the location of both the firm’s 
headquarters and the facility implicated in the violation is provided. In total, from the 1st of 
January 2000 to 18th June 2020 there were 437,412 civil and criminal misconducts in the U.S. 
In this work project, the sample constructed for the event study will only be constituted of 
wrongdoings associated to firms with headquarters in the U.S., since those are assumed to be 
more connected to and influenced by the Federal Government and its party composition. In 
addition, it is only possible to perform an event study by addressing companies traded on the 
stock market. Overall, these requisites reduce the sample under consideration down to 54,300 
misconducts. Charts 1 and 2 depict the considered violations by the year of occurrence and the 
type of offense in its origin, respectively. Then, in order not to overload the computation process 
of Abnormal Returns (ARs), cases against the same firm and registered on the same day were 
merged, by summing its penalty amounts. This process disregards the type of offense incurred 
and reduced the analyzed sample to 37,781 misconducts. It is important to highlight the case of 
some companies that had two or more violations registered in the same week, a fact that further 
supports the usage of a narrow event window and of a trading day gap. Finally, since the WRDS 
Event Study Software was not able to compute Abnormal Returns (ARs) of the event window 
in its entirety for 8,422 records, those were also excluded. In conformity, this paper evaluated 
29,359 events, obtaining the respective CARs.  
On the other hand, the variables used in the proposed regressions were constructed based 
on numerous sources. First, the constituents of the Control Variables Vector were obtained 
through features of the WRDS by Wharton School (University of Pennsylvania). Data on the 
Book-To-Market and Profitability Ratios were retrieved from the Financial Ratios Suite, while 
firm’s stock prices, and number of shares outstanding, components of the variables Size, 
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Volatility, Lagged 1-month and Previous 12-month returns, were downloaded from CRSP 
Monthly Stock/Securities Files. The inclusion of the Control Variables Vector in the studied 
regressions imposed the final decrease in the sample of misconducts under study to 25,462 
given the unavailability of data. This was mostly verified in violations that took place after 
January 2020, given the fact that CRSP was yet to update stock prices verified in the year of 
2020. As explained, the control variables were measured one month before the registration of 
the misconduct, which allowed records of January 2020 to be included in the analysis. 
Consequently, the second part of the work project considered recorded violations that happened 
between the 1st of January 2000 and the 31st of January 2020.   
Finally, the regressors mirroring Political Cycles were constructed by the author based on 
several sources. Since in this regression model, the examined CARs were related to political 
variables with a 6-month lag, this paper focused on the U.S. partisan landscape between July 
the 1st of 1999 and 31st July 2019. Table 2 presents data on the four U.S. Presidents in office 
during the mentioned timespan. It represents data from the Miller Center’s Website of the 
University of Virginia. Information on majority control and initial party composition (at 
inauguration day) of both chambers of Congress was retrieved from the Vital Statistics on 
Congress Report from Brookings and the History, Art & Archives project website. Table 3 
summarizes that evidence for the 11 different party layouts of Congress during the period under 
study in this work project (from Congress 106th to the 116th). Using as inputs the evidence 
retrieved, Table 4 separates the amount of days attributed to each scenario evaluated by the 







5.1. Event Study – Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) and its significance 
As described, the main driver to access overall influence of the misconducts on stock returns 
was the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) metric. Table 5 presents the 
summarized results of the event study performed. For the 29,359 events inspected, 50.789% of 
the obtained Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) were negative and the sample CAAR was 
-0.114%. It is key to highlight the focus CARs are the ones covering the entire event window, 
that ranges from day -3 to 3 (as reference of the event date at 0). In the seven days that establish 
the considered event window, only day -2 had a positive Average Abnormal Return (AAR), 
which means the average felonious firm witnessed a daily fall in its stock price during the event 
window. Days -3 and 3 recorded, respectively, the higher and the second higher absolute values 
for AARs, which highpoints the relevance of evaluating the impact of misconducts beyond the 
day of its registration.  
Moreover, when accessing the significance of the CAAR credited to misconducts, the t-test 
result estimated is -3.252, which suggests it is possible to reject the hypothesis that CAAR is 
null, supporting an overall significant impact of regulatory violations on the offending firm’s 
stock price. This is visually confirmed in chart 3, which graphs the CAAR (-3,τ), with τ 
belonging to the event window. The dotted lines provide the respective 95% confidence interval 
boundaries. Since that interval for CAAR (-3,3) is entirely bellow the x axis, there is strong 
evidence supporting its negative value and significance. The downward trend in CAAR (-3,τ) 
reveals the negative effects of a misconduct are incorporated in equity value before its 
registration and continue through the event window. 
Finally, the results of the Patell Z and the Generalized Sign test are presented in Table 6, 
confirming the stated conclusions. This outcome further affirms misconducts tend to result in 
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equity value losses for the implicated company, which allows for the acceptance of Proposition 
A, described in Section 2. 
5.2. Regression Analysis – The role of Politics 
After proving business misconducts significantly diminish stock prices of felonious 
companies, it will now be evaluated several explanations for the different CARs (-3,3) 
encountered across the studied sample. Table 7 presents the summary statistics for the CARs, 
the dependent variable implemented in this analysis, and the regressors common to all 
regressions studied, Penaltyi,τ0 and the Control Vector, Zi,t0. Then, the values of all political 
dummy variables are discriminated in Table 8, with the corresponding number of misconducts 
associated and its CAAR (-3,3). Lastly, Table 9 depicts the results for all regressions built. 
 As a starting point, focus will be given to the preliminary regression proposed (4), which 
aims to address the role of the penalty fined as a result of the misconduct portrayed. Note that, 
as mentioned, the number of CARs under study in this part of the analysis drops to 25,462 given 
the unavailability of data for the control vector. Consequently, the CAAR (-3,3) of this reduced 
sample is -0.087%. The average monetary punishment verified is 11.694 million dollars, a value 
noticeably above the third quartile, which indicates there is a set of outliers, possibly associated 
with severe misconducts that resulted in extremely high charges against the implicated firms. 
Moreover, the estimated coefficient for the variable Penaltyi,τ0 is almost null, with the t-test 
result indicating its non-significance. This demonstrates there is no solid evidence to reject the 
chance the coefficient’s true value should be different from zero. In accordance, this paper 
cannot prove the registered penalty amount for the wrongdoing carries any influence in the 
resulting stock price variations of the implicated company. This conclusion does not seem odd 
given the fine attributed to companies through legal action usually represents a minor portion 
of the total costs incurred with a misconduct as described by (Carberry, Engelen & Essen 2018). 
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By not including any reputational damages and other costs related with the misbehavior, the 
recorded charge in the used database may fail to efficiently explain the resultant CAR of the 
regulatory violation. 
a) Presidency 
From July 1999 to July 2019, the length of interest to relate with the studied sample of 
misconducts, the Republican Party held the White House for a slightly higher period at 3,844 
days against the Democrats’ 3,491 days in office. However, from the final sample of 
misconducts, 13,669 are attributed to Democratic Presidencies, a value considerably higher 
than the one for Republican Presidents (11,793). At first glance, this seems reasonable given 
the already mentioned desire for increased business regulation idealized by the Democratic 
Party, which shall increase the probability of a certain firm breaching a law and being 
prosecuted for it. Yet, it is not possible to say with certainty these differences are justified purely 
by the party controlling the Presidency. This comparison ignores other factors, like the period 
in which the misconducts occurred, that can be relevant in explaining the numbers recorded. 
Moreover, the estimated CAAR (-3,3) of misconducts attributed to Democratic Presidencies 
is -0.063% and the one for Republican administrations is -0.114%, which indicates an average 
better reaction of felonious firms’ stock prices to violations happening when the President is a 
Democrat. In addition, the coefficient value of the dummy variable DemocraticPresidentτ0 in 
regression (5), suggests a certain wrongdoing would cause a 0.21% higher CAR on the 
implicated company’s stock under a Democratic Presidency. This means usual negative 
consequences of a misconduct are attenuated during Democratic lead administrations. By 





b) U.S. Congress 
Starting by addressing the U.S Senate, for the mentioned relevant period, the GOP 
controlled this chamber during 6 of the 11 Congress meetings. Still, the amount of days in the 
majority was roughly equal for the two parties. Just like in the Presidency, for Democratic-led 
Senate compositions there was a higher number of registered misconducts than the ones during 
GOP control. Conversely, the House of Representatives, in this timeline, only had Democratic 
Leadership in three occasions, amounting to just 1,670 of the analyzed 7,335 days. In 
conformity, by controlling this chamber for a considerably longer time, Republicans were 
linked to an amount of misconducts, approximately, three times greater than those of the 
Democratic Party.  
Furthermore, for both the Senate and the House of Representatives the CAAR (-3,3) was 
greater in the group of misconducts connected with GOP majorities, recording values of 0.000% 
and -0.067%, respectively. On the other hand, the violations sample attributed to Democratic 
control had an average CAR of -0.163% when considering the Senate and -0.145% if the 
chamber of interest is the House of Representatives. Accordingly, the obtained coefficients for 
the variables SenateDemocraticMajτ0 and HouseDemocraticMajτ0, evaluated separately in 
regressions (6) and (7), respectively, were negative in value. By addressing the t-test result, for 
the same misconduct, a Democratic Senate implies a 0.14% inferior CAR, significant for a 95% 
confidence interval. Inversely, the results reveal control of the House of Representatives was 
not relevant in evaluating misconducts’ impact on returns. 
The obtained significant coefficient of SenateDemocraticMajτ0 was unexpected, given the 
fact both (Pastor & Veronesi 2017) and (Kempf & Tsoutsoura 2018), deemed the composition 
of Congress to be non-significant in their studies. This work project acknowledges under 
Republican Senate Majorities, a certain misconduct would trigger a greater CAR on the 
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implicated company, which is an opposing outcome to the one seen in the examination of the 
Presidency. Still, it is worth stating that regressions (6) and (7), individually only focus on one 
chamber of Congress, disregarding the role of all other governing bodies. This is a weak 
definition for Political Cycles and may originate results with poor reliability. Past research has, 
commonly, labeled Political Cycles solely on the party controlling the executive branch (eg. 
(Freixa 2009)), a more meticulous portrayal of Government than only one chamber of Congress.  
c) Political Power Efficiency 
Ideally, since there are differentiating powers among Government entities, the measurement 
of Political Cycles that consider the connection between those bodies will mirror reality with 
greater accuracy. These final regressions are an effort to capture with improved efficiency the 
role of Politics in describing the repercussions of business misconducts.  
During the timespan of interest, Congress had more frequently a same party majority on 
both of its chambers. Similarly, control of the Presidency and the Senate was attributed to one 
party for almost twice the number of days in which there was two parties managing these 
bodies. Conversely, accordance between Presidency and House of Representatives control 
happened for a small number of days, when comparing to a divisive scenario. Finally, as it 
would be expected, having one party with control over the executive and the entire legislative 
branch was uncommon, happening only in 2,887 of the 7,335 days studied. For all cases, the 
most common occurrence also recorded the higher number of registered misconducts.   
Moreover, the sample CAAR (-3,3) was greater for misconducts associated with one party 
control rather than in discordant states. The only exception was with respect to the linking 
between the Presidency and the House of Representatives, in which the computed CAAR (-3,3) 
was superior for the group of misconducts connected with periods of different party oversight 
on these two entities. This exception also revealed a different result in the regression analysis. 
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The obtained coefficient for the variable SamePartyPres&Houseτ0 was the only one not be 
considered significant. All other coefficients, related with the political regressors 
SamePartyCongressτ0, SamePartyPres&Senτ0, and SamePartyGovτ0 were significant at 1% level 
and positive in value, which suggests negative repercussions of misconducts tend to be lower 
when one party has increased governing influence, and ultimately if it controls the legislative 
and executive branches.  
The results of this paper indicate that when one party oversees the Presidency, Senate and 
House of Representatives, the resultant CAR on the stock of a felonious firm is 0.28% higher 
than when there is a division of any kind. Past research asserts divisions in Government prompt 
uncertainty (Sojli & Tham 2015), which may originate poor overall stock market performance. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the suggested regressions sturdily marks Politics as a pertinent 
explanatory factor behind stock price movements attributed to business wrongdoings. 
Therefore, the previously stated Proposition B is proved to be acceptable. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In summary, through the usage of the Event Study framework, this work project quantified 
the impact of registered corporate misconducts, in the U.S, on the stock prices of the felonious 
companies, the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs). It concluded, on average, those events 
cause a significant loss on equity value (Proposition A). Moreover, this paper also studied the 
relevance of Political Cycles in explaining the found stock price deviations. By constructing 
OLS regressions, it was revealed Democratic Presidencies are historically linked with higher 
CARs, suggesting a better stock market reaction to a misconduct that occurred under the 
influence of a Democratic executive administration. Conversely, if the composition of Congress 
is also considered in the classification of Political Cycles, it was found misconducts associated 
with Governments in which one party controls all governing bodies (Presidency, Senate and 
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House of Representatives), tended to result in higher abnormal returns, than those when there 
was divisive oversight of any kind. Ultimately, the significance of various Political Dummy 
variables considered highpoints that Politics has indeed a noteworthy effect in depicting 
misconducts’ resultant CARs (Proposition B).  
It is also important to note the individual results of one regression should not be compared 
with the ones of the other proposed regressions. In this case, for example, it was described 
higher CARs are attained under the leadership of a Democratic President, according to 
regression (5), and with a GOP Senate Majority, as demonstrated in regression (6). However, 
regression (9) indicates CARs tend to be greater when the Presidency and Senate are controlled 
by the same party. At first glance, this may seem inconsistent, but the mentioned outputs are 
not based on the same background. Regression (5) disregards the composition of the Senate and 
(6) neglects the Presidency, while (9) ponders on both bodies. The analysis of the former two 
together does not accurately replicate the latter. In the end, the optimal outcome of this paper is 
the findings of regression (11), since the variable SamePartyGovτ0 is the only one that 
encompasses the party alignment of all governing entities under study. 
Additionally, despite the effort to address the research proposition with a methodology and 
assumptions closely reflecting reality, it is important to remark some limitations of this 
research. First, it is key to clarify the attributed accuracy of both Propositions is based on 
frameworks that rely on past data. Like all studies using these methods, the conclusions of this 
paper are reasonable forecasts and future behavior may deviate from the presented expectations. 
Then, focusing now on the first part of this work project, the concluded veracity of 
Proposition A is strongly based on the fundamentals of the Event Study framework, mainly the 
acceptance that the computed CARs solely reflect the effects of the respective registered 
misconduct. Also, the employment of different input parameters, like the asset pricing model 
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to estimate normal returns or the event window, could possibly alter the described conclusion. 
Moreover, the exclusive consideration of firms with headquarters in the U.S., the location of all 
corporate misconducts in the database, may have created a slight bias in the described findings. 
As (Carberry, Engelen & Essen 2018) demonstrated, when the mentioned locations are in 
accordance the negative values of the CARs are more pronounced. Still, as previously explained 
this was deemed necessary for the second part of this work project. 
On the other hand, the regression analysis also considered some particularities that deem to 
be discussed in this regard. Despite the high number of regulatory violations considered in the 
studied sample, the period under analysis is short to address different Political Cycles. (Pastor 
& Veronesi 2017) and (Freixa 2009) constructed their models using political data beginning in 
the 1920’s, while this paper only considers Presidencies and Congress meetings since 1999. 
Since the research purpose was to relate U.S. Politics and business misconducts, this limitation 
only exists because of the used database of registered violations, which does not contemplate 
any registrations before the year 2000. To further expand this analysis, future research could 
complement the Good Jobs First Database with older corporate wrongdoings, allowing for a 
greater variety of Political Cycles to be studied.  
Furthermore, as stated, the political variables represented party composition in Government 
with a 6-month lag. Even though this assumption was crucial to define official transition within 
the governing bodies, this timeline is just a fair approximation. Every political leadership is 
unique in the time taken to create distinguishing policies. Besides, the accurate measurement 
of that moment is subjective and complex, meaning the best approach should be the inclusion 
of various constant lags, as implemented by (Pastor & Veronesi 2017). Finally, just like in the 
findings of the first part, the ones obtained with the proposed regressions are sturdily related 
with the common chosen inputs, in this case, the constituents of the Control Vector, Zi,t0, and 
Penaltyi,τ0. As mentioned, these explanatory variables are common to all regressions and a 
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removal or replacement of one is sufficient for the encounter of different results, which may 
compromise the acceptance of Proposition B. 
To conclude, the discussed shortcomings in this section may inspire future research, which 
would greatly complement the effort of this work project in exploring the influence of Politics 
in the behavior of a firm’s stock prices when a corporate misconduct is perpetrated. One 
suggestion for a future study would be an approach that quantifies the strength of a majority in 
both branches of Congress. There is lower probability of a political gridlock in Congress, a 
condition that undermines legislative productivity, the higher the difference in the number of 
members between the Democratic and Republican Parties. By resorting exclusively to political 
dummy variables, all majorities within the same party were treated as equal. Likewise, it may 
be worth building a model that also includes the role of the Judicial branch, the only one of the 
three that compose the Federal Government not addressed in this study. Focus should be given 
to the selection of the judges responsible for the litigation of a certain misconduct. Then, one 
may discover if there is a meaningful relationship between the resultant CAR for the offending 
company and the political alignment of the judges or of their appointors. At last, a final 
suggestion would be an analysis beyond the national environment, narrowing the scope to 
State/Local Governments. Within the U.S, there are significant ideological differences, 
translated in state specific laws. It would be pertinent to access whether abnormal stock returns 
caused by a misconduct differ significantly based on the location of the felonious firm’s 
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Table 1 – Detailed Description of the Control Variables Vector 
Control Variables Description 
Book to Market Ratio (BTM) Book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. This metric is 
updated on a quarterly basis. The value for this variable is the most recent 
one available at the measurement date. 
 
Profitability Ratio Ratio of gross profit to total assets. This metric is updated on a quarterly 
basis. The value for this variable is the most recent one available at the 
measurement date. 
 
Size Monthly stock price times number of shares outstanding. The value for Size 
changes every month and corresponds to the one recorded on the 
measurement date’s month. 
 
Lagged one-month stock return Logarithmic return computed with monthly stock prices. This variable is 
the return attributed to the measurement date’s month. 
 
Previous 12-month stock return Sum of the logarithmic monthly returns of the year before the event date. 
From month t – 12 to t – 1, the latter one being the month of the 
measurement date. 
 
Volatility Standard deviation of the logarithmic monthly returns summed in the 
































Chart 1: Recorded Misconducts per year, committed by firms traded in the stock market and with 
headquarters in the U.S. In total, 54,300 cases, from the 1st of January 2000 to 18th of June 2020. Starting in 
2002, the number of violations increased steadily, reaching its peak in 2011. In this year, the number of cases 
more than doubled the one seen in 2002. From 2011 onwards, the yearly misconducts diminished significantly. 
Note the number for 2020 only represents the first six months. 
Chart 1 – Number of Recorded Misconducts per year 
Table 1: Control Variables used in the Vector, Zi,t0. The measurement date for these variables is one month 








Table 2 – U.S. Presidents (Executive Branch) 
President Political Party Inauguration Farewell Vice President 
Bill Clinton Democrat 20/01/1993 20/01/2001 Albert Gore, Jr. 
George W. Bush Republican 20/01/2001 20/01/2009 Richard Cheney 
Barack Obama Democrat 20/01/2009 20/01/2017 Joseph Biden 
Donald J. Trump Republican 20/01/2017 20/01/2021 Mike Pence 









Chart 2: Recorded Misconducts by offense type, committed by firms traded in the stock market and with 
headquarters in the U.S. In total, 54,300 cases, from the 1st of January 2000 to 18th of June 2020. More than 
half of those arose because of violations against safety guidelines. Disrespect of environmental regulations 
and protection of employee rights complete the top three origins behind misbehaviors. 
Chart 2 – Misconducts by Offense Type 
Table 2: U.S. Presidents who served during the timeline under analysis. In this analysis it is considered 
Presidential cycles officially start at inauguration day and end in the inauguration day of the next President. 
Of this list, only President Donald Trump did not serve two terms, given his loss to the Democratic candidate 










Table 3 – U.S. Congress (Legislative Branch)  
   Senate House of Representatives 
Congress 
Number 







106 03/01/1999 03/01/2001 
Albert Gore, 
Jr. (D) 




107 03/01/2001 03/01/2003 
Richard 
Cheney (R) 1 




108 03/01/2003 03/01/2005 
Richard 
Cheney (R) 




109 03/01/2005 03/01/2007 
Richard 
Cheney (R) 




110 03/01/2007 03/01/2009 
Richard 
Cheney (R) 




111 03/01/2009 03/01/2011 
Joseph 
Biden (D) 1 




112 03/01/2011 03/01/2013 
Joseph 
Biden (D) 




113 03/01/2013 03/01/2015 
Joseph 
Biden (D) 




114 03/01/2015 03/01/2017 
Joseph 
Biden (D) 








Paul Ryan (R) 
Republican 
(46-52-2) (194-241-0) 
116 03/01/2019 03/01/2021 
Mike Pence 
(R) 




Table 3: Configuration of the U.S. Congress Meetings during the timeline under analysis. Party Membership 
presented is the one verified at inauguration day (Start Date). Those usually change during the mandate for 
various possible reasons (resignations, deaths, …). D stands for Democratic members and R stands for 
Republican ones. Exceptions are labeled by Other (O), comprising members from other parties, Independents 
and seat vacancies. 
1 The Vice President presides sessions of the U.S. Senate. During presidential transitions, since a new Congress 
is inaugurated 17 days earlier than the swearing-in of the future president, during this residual period, the leaving 
executive branch serves alongside the new congress meeting. This occurred in Congresses 107, 111 and 115, in 
which Vice Presidents Richard Cheney, Joseph Biden and Mike Pence, respectively, did not immediately 
assumed their roles. 
2 The 107th and 110th Congresses had the same number of Democratic and Republican Senators. When this 
happens, usually the party of the presiding officer, who casts a tiebreaking vote when needed, is said to have 
the majority. In the 107th Congress, the Democratic Party had control through the first 17 days but when 
President George Bush was inaugurated and, consequently, Richard Cheney became Vice President, control of 
the body shifted to the Republican Party. Finally, roughly six months later, Republican Senator Jim Jeffords 
changed party, caucusing with the Democrats, which tilted the majority privileges in favor of the latter for the 
rest of the two-year term. Since the Democratic Party had the majority for a longer period, this work assumes 
that state for the entirety of the session. This is the only case in the studied timeframe, in which majority control 
switched during a mandate. Besides, Congress 110, despite having a Republican Presiding Officer, Independent 
Senators Bernie Sanders and Joseph Lieberman caucused with Democrats, giving them a Senate Majority. 






Table 5 – Event Study Results 
τ N. Events AARτ Negative CARs (-3,τ) (%) CAAR (-3,τ) (%) 
-3 29,359 -0.035% 51.405 
-0.035*** 
(-2.623) 
-2 29,359 0.003% 51.395 
-0.031* 
(-1.717) 
-1 29,359 -0.015% 51.453 
-0.047** 
(-2.068) 
0 29,359 -0.009% 51.020 
-0.056** 
(-2.122) 
1 29,359 -0.023% 51.167 
-0.078*** 
(-2.647) 
2 29,359 -0.009% 50.816 
-0.087*** 
(-2.685) 
3 29,359 -0.027% 50.789 
-0.114*** 
(-3.252) 
Table 4 – Number of Days for the various scenarios analyzed in the Political Dummy Variables 
 Number of Days Total Days 
Scenario Yes No 
(from 1st July 1999 to 
31st of July 2019) 
Democratic President? 3,491 3,844 7,335 
Democratic Majority in the Senate? 3,652 3,683 7,335 
Democratic Majority in the House of Representatives? 1,670 5,665 7,335 
Same Party with majority in both Congress Chambers? 4,935 2,400 7,335 
Same Party in the Presidency and Senate? 4,574 2,761 7,335 
Same Party in the Presidency and House of Representatives? 3,600 3,735 7,335 
Same Party controlling Congress and the Presidency? 2,887 4,448 7,335 
Table 5: Event Study Results. In total, 29,359 events were addressed. The CAR (-3, τ) is the sum of Abnormal 
Returns starting at day -3 until day τ. Accordingly, the CAR (-3,-3) is simply the Abnormal Return (AR) of 
day -3. Conversely, CAR (-3,3) is the sum comprising ARs for the entire event window. In the CAAR (-3, τ) 
column, it is presented in the first line the estimated Cumulative Average Abnormal Return metric and in the 
second line, in brackets, the corresponding t-test statistic. As an indicative measure *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Table 4: Number of days in which the scenarios reflecting the proposed political dummy variables were a 
reality. In this work project, the landscape of U.S. Politics was addressed from the 1st of July 1999 to the 31st 
of July 2019, a period that comprised 7,335 days. Evidently, either the Republican or Democratic Party 
























Table 6 – Results of the Complimentary Tests 
  Patell Z Test Generalized Sign Test 
τ CAAR (-3,τ) (%) Result P-Value Result P-Value 
3 -0.114 -3.385 0.0007 -2.147 0.0318 
 τ = 
Critical Values  -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
CAAR (-3,τ) - 1.96 -0.009% 0.004% -0.002% -0.004% -0.020% -0.023% -0.045% 
CAAR (-3,τ) + 1.96 -0.060% -0.067% -0.091% -0.107% -0.136% -0.150% -0.182% 
Chart 3: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) analysis. Each solid line point represents the CAAR 
(-3,τ) of the sample, with τ being a day belonging to the event window (x axis). Additionally, the dotted lines 
represent the border values for a 95% confidence interval. These values are obtained based on the t-test 
procedure. It is possible to be 95% confident that the true value of CAAR credited to misconducts is within 
the mentioned boundaries. This chart was automatically generated by the Event Study Software by WRDS.
Chart 3 – CAAR (-3,τ) and the t-test resultant critical values for a 95% Confidence Interval 
(τ) 
Table 6: Results of the proposed complimentary tests. Just like the value for the t-test, the Patell Z statistic 
provides a 99% confidence level that the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) of the felonious 
firms’ population is different from zero and negative. Alternatively, despite the Generalized Sign Test 
confirming the conclusions of the other mentioned tests, it does so with a slightly lower confidence level, only 









Table 7 – Summary Statistics for the Regressand and the Control Variables 
 Count Mean Std. Deviation Q1 Q2 Q3 
CAR (-3,3) (%) 25,462 - 0.087 0.035 - 2.340 - 0.051 2.210 
Penalty (M$) 25,462 11.694 1.456 0.008 0.018 0.083 
       
Control Variables       
Book to Market Ratio 25,462 0.637 0.004 0.322 0.509 0.798 
Profitability Ratio 25,462 0.265 0.001 0.122 0.218 0.350 
Size (M$) 25,462 35.798 0.435 2.660 9.690 31.815 
Lagged 1-Month Return (%) 25,462 0.106 0.074 - 4.429 0.872 5.690 
Previous 12-Month Return (%) 25,462 1.831 0.250 - 14.440 6.536 23.240 
Volatility (%) 25,462 9.633 0.041 5.453 7.899 11.681 
Table 8 – Insights on the Proposed Political Variables 
 Value Misconducts Associated CAAR (-3,3) (%) 
DemocraticPresident 
1 13,669 -0.063 
0 11,793 -0.114 
SenateDemocraticMaj 
1 13,513 -0.163 
0 11,949 -0.000 
HouseDemocraticMaj 
1 6,296 -0.145 
0 19,166 -0.067 
SamePartyCongress 
1 16,933 -0.022 
0 8,529 -0.216 
SamePartyPres&Sen 
1 16,700 -0.082 
0 8,762 -0.096 
SamePartyPres&House 
1 11,481 -0.114 
0 13,981 -0.065 
SamePartyGov 
1 9,826 -0.042 
0 15636 -0.115 
Table 7: Summary statistics for the dependent variable, CAR (-3,3), and the regressors common to all the 
studied regressions. As stated, due to lack of data for the control variables, the sample of misconducts studied 
in the second part of this study was reduced from 29,359 to 25,462.
Table 8: Possible values for all the considered political variables. For each value and regressor, it is presented 
the number of misconducts associated and the resultant Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR). The 




Table 9 – Regression Analysis 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Penalty 
3.895E-07 3.591E-07 4.482E-07 3.891E-07 4.647E-07 3.677E-07 4.363E-07 4.949E-07 
(0.35) (0.32) (0.40) (0.35) (0.42) (0.33) (0.39) (0.45) 
DemocraticPresident 
 0.0021***       
 (2.96)       
SenateDemocraticMaj 
  -0.0014**      
  (-2.00)      
HouseDemocraticMaj 
   -0.0007     
   (-0.77)     
SamePartyCongress 
    0.0019***    
    (2.58)    
SamePartyPres&Sen 
     0.0028***   
     (3.66)   
SamePartyPres&House 
      0.0011  
      (1.57)  
SamePartyGov 
       0.0028*** 
       (4.27) 
BTM Ratio 
-0.0024 -0.0026 -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0024 
(-1.22) (-1.31) (-1.17) (-1.22) (-1.15) (-1.30) (-1.21) (-1.20) 
Profitability Ratio 
-0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0020 
(-0.83) (-0.81) (-0.82) (-0.83) (-0.81) (-0.88) (-0.83) (-0.84) 
Size 
-7.638E-06** -7.590E-06** -7.666E-06** -7.542E-06** -7.697E-06** -7.636E-06** -7.550E-06** -7.565E-06** 
(-2.16) (-2.14) (-2.17) (-2.13) (-2.17) (-2.16) (-2.13) (-2.14) 
Lagged 1-Month Stock Return 
-0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0021 
(-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.39) (-0.36) (-0.38) (-0.34) (-0.36) (-0.36) 
Previous 12-Month Return 
-0.0170*** -0.0174*** -0.0170*** -0.0170*** -0.0170*** -0.0178*** -0.0172*** -0.0176*** 
(-8.65) (-8.77) (-8.64) (-8.67) (-8.63) (-8.94) (-8.75) (-8.90) 
Volatility 
-0.0498*** -0.0495*** -0.0494*** -0.0492*** -0.0508*** -0.0479*** -0.0503*** -0.0502*** 
(-4.65) (-4.63) (-4.62) (-4.57) (-4.73) (-4.48) (-4.68) (-4.69) 
Number of Observations 25,462 25,462 25,462 25,462 25,462 25,462 25,462 25,462 
Adjusted R2 0.0138 0.0141 0.0139 0.0138 0.0140 0.0143 0.0138 0.0143 
F-Test Statistic 12.91*** 11.77*** 12.04*** 11.59*** 11.85*** 12.48*** 11.68*** 13.16*** 
Table 9: Results of the Regression Analysis. Each column represents one regression, numbered as it was referenced in the text (from (4) to (11)). The coefficients were 
estimated using OLS and are presented, for each variable, in the first horizontal line. To account for possible Heteroskedasticity, the analysis considered robust standard 
errors, which were computed using the sandwich estimator of variance method. In accordance, bellow each estimated coefficient, the t-test statistic is presented in between 
brackets. The latter is associated with the null hypothesis that the respective coefficient is zero. For each regression, the Adjusted R2 and the F-Test result is also provided. 
As an indicative measure *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Finally, E indicates power of 10 in scientific notation: mEn = m*10n.
